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Global balance and ﬁ  nancial stability: 
twin objectives 
toward a resilient global economic system 
Under the impetus of the recent global ﬁ  nancial crisis, there has been a growing recognition that the 
global imbalances are a systemic problem that has a great bearing on the macroeconomic policies of a 
number of countries as well as on cross-border capital ﬂ  ows, and that they might be linked both directly 
and indirectly to the global crisis. In this sense, the G20, as the premier forum for the resolution of global 
economic issues, should lead the drive for comprehensive and systematic reforms to attain global balance 
and ﬁ  nancial stability, twin objectives toward a resilient global economic system. 
For this, we must ﬁ  rst ﬂ  esh out the Framework established in 2009 to boost policy coordination among 
member countries. Our efforts made in building the Global Financial Safety Nets and in ﬁ  nancial regulatory 
reform must be maintained, and tangible outcomes must be reached on key issues including improvements 
in the International Monetary System and the establishment of a Macroprudential Policy Framework. 
In addition, central banks must develop monetary policy frameworks that can effectively address the 
problem of boom and bust in asset prices so as to ensure ﬁ  nancial stability. 
The policy coordination pursued by the G20 is indispensable for the shared growth of the global economy, 
but is not an easy task as it may run counter to the short-term interests of individual countries. However, we 
have succeeded in narrowing differences between our opinions on major issues over the course of previous 
G20 meetings, which is itself a valuable step in building up mutual trust. In this regard, I believe the G20 




FSR15_61_72_CORÉE.indd   61 FSR15_61_72_CORÉE.indd   61 04/02/2011   16:18:58 04/02/2011   16:18:58Global imbalances and ﬁ  nancial stability
62  Banque de France ￿ Financial Stability Review ￿ No. 15 ￿ February 2011
Global balance and ﬁ  nancial stability: twin objectives toward a resilient global economic system
Choongsoo Kim
T
he recent global financial crisis has led 
us to a realisation that global imbalances 
are a systemic problem which has a great 
bearing on the macroeconomic policies of a number 
of countries as well as on cross-border capital ﬂ  ows. 
They may be seen as being both directly and indirectly 
linked to the recent ﬁ  nancial crisis. More people have 
come to support the view that the global imbalances 
and ﬁ  nancial instability were mutually reinforcing 
through their interlinkages, and precipitated a 
fully-ﬂ  edged global crisis due to globalisation. 
Based on a growing consensus that the global 
imbalances are a problem that must be tackled to 
secure sustainable and stable growth of the global 
economy, the G20 countries agreed on the need 
for structural analysis to identify their causes, 
together with close international policy coordination. 
To this end, at the 2009 G20 Pittsburgh Summit, 
the G20 leaders called for the establishment of a 
Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced 
Growth. At the 2010 G20 Seoul Summit, they 
consequently adopted a comprehensive policy action 
plan (the so-called “Seoul Action Plan”) for the future 
policy directions of G20 countries.
In what follows, I will ﬁ  rst review trends in global 
imbalances, then touch on the issues of their 
causative factors, their sustainability, and their 
linkages with ﬁ  nancial stability. Then, I seek to 
suggest some feasible policy responses for alleviating 
global imbalances and preventing the recurrence of 
ﬁ  nancial crises. 
1| GLOBAL IMBALANCES: TRENDS, 
CAUSES AND SUSTAINABILITY
1|1  Global imbalance trend
Looking at the period from the 1980s, we can identify 
three major phases of global imbalance episodes, each 
having its own distinct characteristics and causative 
factors, but with an emphasis on the changing US deﬁ  cit.
FIRST PHASE OF GLOBAL IMBALANCES: THE 1980S
The United States registered large current account 
deﬁ  cits from 1980 onwards, highlighting the issue 
of current account imbalances.1 During this period, 
its deﬁ  cits in trade with advanced countries such as 
Japan and Germany made up almost 50% of the total 
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Source: IMF WEO database, April 2010.
1  The US current account deﬁ  cit increased as a ratio against GDP from 0.2% to 3.4% during 1982-1987, while increasing as a percentage of the total global current 
account deﬁ  cits from 3.5% to 57.5% over the same period.
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Current account imbalances at that time were 
a problem that was conﬁ  ned to a few advanced 
countries, and so they were more or less easily dealt 
with within advanced-country cooperative forums 
such as the G5. To be more speciﬁ  c, the current 
account imbalances were resolved quickly through 
the exchange rate adjustments made in line with 
the 1985 Plaza Accord, the US ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit reduction 
under the 1987 Louvre Accord, and the efforts to 
boost domestic demand in both Japan and Germany, 
running the largest current account surplus positions. 
SECOND PHASE OF GLOBAL IMBALANCES: THE 1990S
Global balance appeared to have been restored in 
the ﬁ  rst half of the 1990s, until imbalances again 
worsened with the rapid widening of the US current 
account deﬁ  cit from 1996. While Japan, the furthest in 
the black on the current account, continued to record 
large surpluses, they also widened signiﬁ  cantly in 
oil-producing countries and emerging Asian countries 
after the 1998 Asian Currency Crisis.
During this period, the US economy recorded rapid growth 
with the development of the information technology (IT) 
sector, and capital inﬂ  ows to the United States increased 
as well. This led to a strong dollar, which further 
entrenched the chronic US current account deﬁ  cit.
THIRD PHASE OF GLOBAL IMBALANCES: EARLY 2000S
In the early 2000s, the problem of current account 
imbalances spread out to encompass not just the 
United States and other G7 countries, but a number of 
certain European countries, emerging countries and 
oil producers, becoming a worldwide phenomenon.2
Prior to the global ﬁ  nancial crisis, the current account 
deﬁ  cit-to-GDP ratio in the United States increased 
from 3.9% in 2001 to 5.2% in 2007,3 while those 
of certain European countries running a current 
account deﬁ  cit4 expanded on average from 2.0% to 
5.0%3  during the same period. Meanwhile, among 
countries running a current account surplus, 
advanced countries including Japan and Germany, 
emerging Asian countries and oil producers all 
recorded larger surpluses during this period. 
CURRENT TRENDS AND PROSPECTS
When the global ﬁ  nancial crisis erupted in 2008, the 
world economy contracted sharply, and the global 
2  Total current account deﬁ  cits as a percentage of global GDP increased from 1.8% in 2001 to 2.7% in 2006. 
3  IMF WEO database (April 2010).
4  Greece, Italy, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom.
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Persistent foreign exchange rate misalignments 
among major countries
 
One of the major arguments is that the accumulation 
of US current account deﬁ  cits is related to inﬂ  exible 
exchange policy on the parts of some of its major 
trading partners and that the US dollar must 
depreciate further in order to resolve this issue.6 
This argument relies basically on the inverse 
relationship between the US current account and 
the exchange value of the dollar since the 1980s. 
Widening differences in net savings rates 
between major countries
Another argument7 emphasises widening 
differences in net savings rates between deﬁ  cit 
and surplus countries. Major surplus countries 
including China and Germany showed steady 
increases in positive Net National Savings 
(savings rate – investment rate) prior to the global 
ﬁ  nancial crisis, while the United States and the 
United Kingdom recorded decreased saving rates. 
In this argument, there are structural factors 
other than exchange rates behind this trend.
They attribute the large current account surpluses 
of emerging countries to economic and social factors 
such as opaque corporate management, inadequate 
social safety nets, and demographic structure. To be 
more speciﬁ  c, ﬁ  nancing channels have been limited 
due to their less developed capital markets, and 
corporate governance and management, especially 
in large corporations, have lacked transparency. 
imbalances eased temporarily.5 However, since global 
economic activity began to recover from early 2010, 
they have been increasing once again. International 
organisations such as the IMF and the OECD forecast 
that global imbalances will not be as large as prior to 
the crisis for the time being, but that they will steadily 
expand as the United States and other economies 
continue to recover and consumption increases.
In retrospect, the trend of global imbalances since 
the 1980s shows they are becoming a global issue, 
expanding from a matter of concern to a small 
number of advanced countries to affect many others, 
including emerging economies. The response to 
global imbalances must therefore also be made 
through global cooperative forums such as the G20. 
1|2  Imbalances and sustainability: 
causative factors
CAUSATIVE FACTORS OF IMBALANCES
Among academics, a great deal of argument has 
been raised about the factors that bring about these 
imbalances. However, there is not just one factor that 
can explain them: the question of what generates 
them is a very complex, structural issue. 
5  Total current account deﬁ  cits as a percentage of global GDP decreased from 2.7% in 2008 to 1.8% in 2009. 
6  Mussa (2004), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005), and Blanchard et al. (2005) proposed devaluations of the US dollar of 30%, 15-34%, and 40-90%, respectively in order 
to resolve the country’s chronic current account deﬁ  cit.
7  Chamon and Prasad (2010), Servén and Nguyen (2010).
Chart 4
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Sources: IMF WEO database, April 2010, BIS.
Table 1
Net national savings trends of major surplus 
and deﬁ  cit countries
(% of GDP)
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
China 2.0 4.2 2.4 2.5 2.5 7.5 7.9
Germany -0.6 -0.8 -1.6 2.2 4.8 6.5 6.7
United States -1.8 -1.4 -2.8 -4.1 -5.2 -4.2 -5.7
United Kingdom -0.8 -0.4 -2.7 -1.7 -2.1 -3.4 -1.6
Note: Net National Savings = saving rate – investment rate.
Note:   Investment rate = [(Gross domestic ﬁ  xed capital formation + increase 
in stocks)/GDP] × 100.
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics System (ECOS).
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Firms generally have been heavily dependent on 
internal funding, causing corporate savings in these 
countries to be relatively higher than in advanced 
countries. Furthermore, the inadequacy of social 
safety nets, such as pension systems, health care, 
etc., has motivated precautionary savings, while it 
has been difﬁ  cult for households to approach the 
ﬁ  nancial markets to, for instance, take out consumer 
loans. Lastly, in their demographic structure, these 
countries mostly have a large share of young people, 
who normally show a greater propensity to save.
For the structural factors behind the declining 
US saving rate, some authors8 cite the decline 
in long-term interest rates in line with the dissolution 
to some degree of economic uncertainty9 from 
the 1980s. Moreover, some10 posit that current account 
deﬁ  cits increased because asset prices soared prior to 
the global ﬁ  nancial crisis, and expectations of further 
increases encouraged an expansion of consumption 
(reduced savings).
Increased ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cits
In the case of the United States and several European 
countries, the expansion of the ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit was seen 
as a main reason for a persistent current account 
deﬁ  cit.11
In general, an increased ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit serves as a 
factor in sustaining a current account deﬁ  cit because 
it narrows the savings-investment gap in the overall 
economy and reduces the public sector savings 
capacity. In the case of the United States, security 
costs increased exponentially after 9/11 in 2001 and 
the ﬁ  scal balance shifted into deﬁ  cit12 from 2002. 
In the case of European countries running a current 
account deﬁ  cit, the tax base has been weakened due 
among other things to high unemployment rates, 
while ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cits have widened as a consequence of 
the aging population and increased welfare provisions. 
Preference for safe assets
Regarding the reasons for the persistence of the global 
imbalances, some academics13 claim it to be caused 
by imbalances in the supply of and demand for safe 
assets, which many prefer for their perceived safety 
and liquidity. 
After the Asian Currency Crisis in the 1990s, the 
demand for safe assets increased as emerging countries 
accumulated large volumes of precautionary reserves 
against the possibility of another crisis. In contrast, 
because of the bursting of the Japanese asset bubble 
in the 1990s and Europe’s economic slowdown, 
advanced countries other than the United States 
had a signiﬁ  cantly lower capacity for supplying safe 
assets, and demand has therefore concentrated on 
the United States with a consequent supply/demand 
disequilibrium for safe assets in the early 2000s. 
8  Barnett and Straub (2008) analysed monetary policy as the factor exerting the greatest inﬂ  uence on US current account movements.
9  The trend of decline in the volatility of macroeconomic variables in this period is generally referred to as the “Great Moderation”.
10 Fratzscher  et al. (2007) analysed that the asset price hikes, as in the case of housing, shocked the market and led to an increase in long-term consumption 
and exchange rate appreciation, which continually widened the US trade deﬁ  cit.
11  Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005), Salvatore (2006).
12  Normandin (1999) conducted analysis with a VAR model using the US national income and balance of payments data from 1950 to 1992, and published results 
noting that one dollar of ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit led to between 0.22 and 0.98 of a dollar of current account deﬁ  cit. 
13  Caballero (2006), Caballero et al. (2008).
Chart 5
Total foreign reserves and foreign holdings 
of US Treasury notes
(USD trillions)
Total foreign reserves







Foreign holdings of US Treasury notes
Note: The data of foreign holdings of US Treasury notes are not available 
from 1995 to 2001.
Source: IMF COFER.
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Securing collateral to attract overseas investment capital 
While peripheral (emerging) countries sought 
to increase their exports to core (key currency) 
countries by exchange rate depreciation as part of 
their economic growth strategy, there were also 
efforts within peripheral countries to expand core 
country assets, such as US Treasury notes, that serve 
as collateral for securing stable investment capital in 
such forms as FDI from the core countries. This is cited 
as another reason behind the global imbalances.14
In the former Bretton Woods System, the United States  
was the core country with Japan and Europe the 
peripheral ones. More recently, however, emerging 
economies have become the peripheral countries, 
forming the “Bretton Woods II” system, and this 
serves as a factor in sustaining the global imbalances. 
SUSTAINABILITY
Given the interaction in the global economy between 
the various causative factors of global imbalances, 
there are two different views as to whether they 
could persist in the future. 
Disequilibrium approach
Advocates of the disequilibrium approach15 argue that 
the global imbalances are not sustainable because 
they reﬂ  ect macroeconomic imbalances such as 
exchange rate misalignment among major countries, 
the low savings rates and widened ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cits of 
current account deﬁ  cit countries. Therefore, they are 
concerned about the possibility of the global ﬁ  nancial 
market becoming unstable and the global economy 
facing a hard landing should the macroeconomic 
imbalances not be adjusted, and, in consequence, the 
exchange value of the US dollar drop abruptly due to 
the accumulation of US net external debt. 
Equilibrium approach
The equilibrium approach16 states that current 
account surplus and deﬁ  cit countries will form a 
symbiotic relationship, as surplus countries continue 
to show high demand for the assets of deficit 
countries, such as US Treasury notes. This approach 
thus views the global imbalances as being sustainable 
in the future, due to the tendency toward high 
savings rates in China and other surplus countries, 
to emerging countries’ securing of collateral to attract 
investment capital (FDI, etc.), and to the preference 
for safe assets. 
Recent approach
The global imbalances have come to be seen as 
being both directly and indirectly linked to the global 
ﬁ  nancial crisis, partly supporting the disequilibrium 
approach. There is therefore now a widespread 
consensus that countries need to coordinate their 
macroeconomic policies, structural reforms and 
overall economic policies to correct the global 
imbalances. 
Although the recent ﬁ  nancial crisis led to neither 
a plunge of the US dollar nor a hard landing of the 
global economy, deviating from the forecast of the 
disequilibrium approach, we cannot ignore the 
possibility that its prognosis may prove correct in 
the future. Efforts must therefore be continued to 
deal with the problem in the global economy by 
way of the G20.
2| LINKAGES 
BETWEEN GLOBAL IMBALANCES 
AND FINANCIAL STABILITY
2|1  Characteristics of global ﬁ  nancial crisis 
In the post-Bretton Woods era there were three major 
ﬁ  nancial crises that took place prior to the recent 
global ﬁ  nancial crisis: the 1980s Latin American 
foreign debt crisis, the 1990s Nordic Banking Crisis, 
and the 1990s Asian Currency Crisis. These crises 
differ in their causes, but are similar in that they were 
scarcely linked with global imbalances. The recent 
global ﬁ  nancial crisis was fundamentally different, 
however, as it was triggered, spread and intensiﬁ  ed 
through mutually reinforcing interactions between 
global imbalances and ﬁ  nancial sector imbalances. 
This mechanism of crisis generation formed quite 
recently against the backdrop of the financial 
account liberalisation, ﬁ  nancial deregulation and 
the acceleration of ﬁ  nancial innovation.
14 Dooley  et al. (2003, 2007).
15  Summers (2004), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005), Cline (2005, 2007), Bergsten (2007), Feldstein (2008).
16 Dooley  et al. (2003), Caballero (2006), Caballero et al. (2008).
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17  DeLong (2008), Dooley and Garber (2009), Backus and Cooley (2010).
18  Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009), Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti (2009), Roubini (2009), Portes (2009).
Box
Characteristics of major ﬁ  nancial crises in the 1980s and 1990s
Latin American foreign debt crisis
In the 1980s, Latin American countries including Mexico pushed ahead with government-led economic growth strategies 
focused on raising domestic demand, as well as encouraging the export of resources and the fostering of import 
substitution industries. In this process, their external debt increased greatly, especially in the public sector, leading to a 
foreign debt crisis. What is seen as a decisive factor in this situation is the sharp reduction in Latin American countries’ 
debt repayment capacity and the abrupt surge in capital outﬂ  ows as international interest rates rose precipitately whereas 
the prices of oil and other commodities fell. 
Nordic banking crisis
During the 1980s, three Nordic countries –Sweden, Finland and Norway– experienced signiﬁ  cant increases in bank 
loans, excessive credit expansion and the build-up of asset price bubbles while pursuing social welfare policies by way 
of progress in ﬁ  nancial liberalisation and the exemption of loan interest from tax. Then, around 1990, these countries 
all raised their policy rates and scrapped tax exemptions on interest earnings, while at the same time experiencing an 
economic slowdown due to a decline in exports brought about by a global economic downturn. This led to plunging asset 
prices and increased insolvencies, resulting in a banking crisis in the region.
Asian currency crisis
Thailand, Indonesia and Korea had stable macroeconomic policies with relatively strong ﬁ  scal soundness and were 
promoting gradual ﬁ  nancial liberalisation. Despite these conditions, they were hit by the crisis in the late 1990s due to 
high debt rates in their private sectors and sudden stops in capital ﬂ  ows. Related to this crisis, academics1 warn that if 
negative investor expectations as to government policies are formed, these expectations can become self-fulﬁ  lling and 
lead to sudden stops in capital ﬂ  ows and the eruption and spread of ﬁ  nancial crisis.
1  Obstfeld (1996), Calvo (1998), etc.
2|2  Views on linkages 
between global imbalances 
and ﬁ  nancial instability 
There have been contrasting opinions put forward as 
to whether the global imbalances played a major role 
in the recent global ﬁ  nancial crisis. Some argue that 
the linkages between the two are fairly weak, while 
others see signiﬁ  cant interactions between them.
WEAK LINKAGES
Some17 voice the opinion that the global imbalances 
were not closely related to the recent global crisis. 
Their argument runs that, in the crisis, the continuous 
capital flows to the United Sates strengthened 
the US dollar in contrast to the predictions of the 
disequilibrium approach. These pundits see the cause 
of the recent crisis as being insufﬁ  cient ﬁ  nancial 
regulation and weak supervisory measures, and insist 
that the global imbalances were rather a sideshow or 
played the role of an innocent bystander. 
STRONG LINKAGES
This school of thought argues that although the global 
imbalances did not directly cause the recent ﬁ  nancial 
crisis, they played a critical role in heightening the 
possibility of its outbreak.
Before the crisis, current account surplus countries 
increased their holdings of foreign reserves in 
US dollar-denominated assets, inducing long-term 
interest rates at a low level, a phenomenon called 
the “Greenspan conundrum”. Low interest rates thus 
led to the formation of the asset price bubble, which 
is why the global imbalances are seen to have played 
at least the role of a handmaiden in the eruption of 
the crisis.18
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Shin (2009), Acharya and Schnabl (2009), and others 
believe that the global imbalances played a critical role 
in the recent crisis, as in the process of asset bubble 
formation they added to ﬁ  nancial innovation and 
induced the rapid growth of ﬁ  nancial intermediaries. 
From the 2000s, foreign investment in US ﬁ  nancial 
products like asset-backed securities (ABS) increased 
dramatically, which helped form the asset price 
bubble through rapid credit expansion. At the same 
time, the wealth effect associated with the asset price 
appreciation increased consumption to a large extent, 
intensifying the vicious circle of global imbalances. 
 
Despite the acceleration of ﬁ  nancial innovation and 
rapid growth of ﬁ  nancial intermediaries, however, 
there was a failure to exercise adequate ﬁ  nancial 
regulation and supervision, which allowed excessive 
ﬁ  nancial institution risk-taking to continue. Central 
bank responses were also ineffective in addressing 
the problem of boom and bust in asset prices, 
contributing to the escalation of ﬁ  nancial system 
instability.
The recent global ﬁ  nancial crisis has demonstrated 
that, in an environment where there is only a 
limited number of reserve currencies, global 
imbalance accumulation disrupts stability within 
the International Monetary System (IMS), and thus 
also increases the possibility of crisis. 
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008, the global ﬁ  nancial system became 
highly unstable and an intense “dollar crunch” occurred. 
Some emerging economies faced acute currency 
mismatch problems as they had a heavy dependence on 
foreign capital for business investment funds and faced 
a liquidity crunch due to sudden outﬂ  ows of foreign 
capital. The dollar crunch was a serious problem not 
only for emerging markets but also for reserve currency 
areas like the United Kingdom and the euro area. It 
moderated only after the US Federal Reserve supplied 
dollar liquidity under central bank swap agreements19 
concluded with central banks in both major advanced 
and emerging economies.
As we have seen above, an examination of the 
linkages between the global imbalances and 
ﬁ  nancial instability demonstrates a close relationship 
between them, through which they became mutually 
reinforcing. It would be no exaggeration to say that 
the global imbalances contributed both directly and 
indirectly to the outbreak of the recent crisis, which 
entails that enhancing ﬁ  nancial stability by their 
correction will help prevent the recurrence of crises.
Chart 7
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Source: S&P/Case Shiller National Home Price Index.
19  The currency swap facilities made available under the central bank swap agreements of the US Federal Reserve were USD 80 billion with the Bank of England, 
USD 120 billion with the Bank of Japan, USD 240 billion with the ECB, and USD 30 billion each with the Bank of Canada, the Reserve Bank of Australia, 
and the Bank of Korea.
Chart 6
Proportion of foreign investment in US treasury notes
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3| RESOLVING GLOBAL IMBALANCES 
  AND PREVENTING FINANCIAL CRISES 
3|1  Sustaining a systematic response 
through the G20 
The G20, as the premier forum for international 
economic cooperation, has since the outbreak of the 
recent global ﬁ  nancial crisis, focused on measures 
to respond to it effectively, to prevent its recurrence 
and to establish a foundation for sustainable and 
balanced global growth in the future.
At the Seoul Summit in November 2010, G20 leaders 
endorsed speciﬁ  c agreements on key agenda items, 
including further development of the Framework, 
IMF reform, ﬁ  nancial regulatory reform and the 
improvement of Global Financial Safety Nets (GFSNs). 
They also set the foundation for continuing efforts to 
develop a new global economic paradigm, by agreeing to 
further discuss the establishment of a Macroprudential 
Policy Framework and measures to enhance 
International Monetary System stability –new agenda 
items proposed by Korea and France, respectively. 
These efforts by the G20 are prompted by a recognition 
of the need for countries to sustain a comprehensive 
and systematic response through the G20, rather 
than taking separate measures on individual issues, 
as the recent crisis was triggered and ampliﬁ  ed by 
the interlinkages between the global imbalances and 
the ﬁ  nancial instability engendered by asset price 
bubbles. The G20 will therefore continue its efforts to 
improve the Framework, ﬁ  nancial regulatory reform 
and the GFSNs based upon the achievements made 
in 2010, and along with this it will prepare measures 
to secure stability in the IMS. 
FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRAMEWORK
Global imbalances are not merely an issue of 
exchange rates. Resolving them calls for both current 
account surplus and deﬁ  cit countries to improve their 
overall economic policies, including macroeconomic 
and structural policies through close coordination.
The governments and private sectors of current 
account surplus countries must, on the one hand, be 
encouraged to lower their savings rates and expand 
domestic demand, by fostering service industries, etc. 
Current account deﬁ  cit countries must, on the other 
hand, take measures to raise savings in the public 
sector and develop policy options that induce higher 
private savings even after economic recovery. 
FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM
It is generally admitted that the recent ﬁ  nancial 
crisis occurred as global imbalances were intensiﬁ  ed 
by the inadequacy of ﬁ  nancial sector regulation 
and supervision. Taking this on board, additional 
discussions on the establishment of a Macroprudential 
Policy Framework, on ﬁ  nancial regulatory reform 
from an emerging markets’ perspective and on 
stronger regulations on shadow banking as proposed 
by France must take place as the G20 leaders agreed 
at the Seoul Summit. This needs to be accompanied 
by the agreed reform of banks’ capital and liquidity 
standards. 
In particular, the establishment of a Macroprudential 
Policy Framework promises to reduce side effects such 
as asset price bubbles that can be caused by sudden 
increases in capital ﬂ  ows, by mitigating ﬁ  nancial 
sector procyclicality and preventing systemic risks 
that may occur from strong linkages among ﬁ  nancial 
institutions. For this, it is essential that we develop 
diverse macroprudential policy instruments that can 
mitigate procyclicality, including countercyclical 
capital buffers and dynamic provisioning. We must 
also develop regulations on and supervisory 
measures for Systemically Important Financial 
Institutions (SIFIs), as stronger linkages among 
ﬁ  nancial institutions lead to network externalities 
whereby the mismanagement of an individual 
institution can affect other institutions, and cause 
the spreading out of a crisis through spill-over effects.
 
In the wake of the global ﬁ  nancial crisis, central 
banks also need to sustain their efforts to maintain 
ﬁ  nancial stability by developing monetary policy 
frameworks that can effectively address the problem 
of boom and bust in asset prices. 
BUILDING GLOBAL FINANCIAL SAFETY NETS
The GFSNs will serve as effective instruments for 
countries to cope with sudden capital stops, by 
complementing their foreign reserve holdings. 
At the same time, they will contribute to the 
prevention of crises and their ex-post resolution, 
ultimately helping restore global economic balance.
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Emerging countries may have less incentive to 
accumulate foreign reserves, which will in turn 
reduce distortions in exchange rates due to market 
intervention. Exchange rate uncertainties may in 
addition be relieved as global imbalances could be 
unwound, which would help both advanced and 
emerging economies. In 2010, the IMF lending 
facilities were improved to expand the GFSN functions 
but, as discussed at the Seoul Summit, efforts directed 
toward improving GFSNs must be continued. 
SECURING STABILITY IN THE IMS
The recent crisis has underlined the point that the IMS 
is becoming less stable. The current IMS, involving 
the use of a limited number of reserve currencies, 
must be improved in terms of its institutional aspects 
as well as policy aspects including greater exchange 
rate ﬂ  exibility.
The IMS currently rests on the assumption that global 
imbalances will resolve themselves as a matter of 
course under ﬂ  exible exchange rate systems, implying 
that countries need to heighten the ﬂ  exibility of their 
national exchange rate policies. Moreover, while the 
IMS is still managed under conditions where there 
is only a small number of reserve currencies, the 
proportion of global trade involving non-reserve 
currency countries has been increasing, in turn 
further reducing the IMS’s stability. We therefore 
need to continue discussions on how to deal with 
these problems.
In this context, we need to keep in mind what a 
Belgian economist pointed out as a dilemma at the 
outset of the Bretton Woods System. Robert Trifﬁ  n 
in 1947 warned that, if global trade relies on one 
key-currency like the US dollar, the issuance of that 
currency necessarily expands in line with increases 
in global trade, resulting in an unmanageable level 
of debt for the key-currency issuing country and 
growing IMS instability. This warning talk warrants 
our keen attention as shown by the “reserve currency 
crunch” in the course of the 2008 global ﬁ  nancial 
crisis.
3|2  Future challenges for the G20
During 2010, the G20 sought to overcome the global 
financial crisis and establish a new post-crisis 
global economic paradigm, and it may pride itself 
on not-inconsiderable achievements including the 
reaching of agreements on several agenda items, by 
steadily narrowing the differences in opinion among 
its members. Despite such progress, however, global 
uncertainties remain –those related for example to the 
possibilities of a contraction of the economy in major 
countries, and of further deterioration in national 
ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cits, which again makes policy coordination 
among countries more difﬁ  cult than before. 
In regard to the G20’s efforts to resolve the global 
imbalances and enhance ﬁ  nancial stability, some 
have expressed concerns about the feasibility of 
the G20 agreements. Considering that the G20 
does not have a long track record, and that there is 
no hard printed rule on the implementation of the 
agreements, these concerns are plausible. 
Nevertheless, under certain conditions, soft rules 
can be just as effective as hard printed rules. This is 
the case when the G20 builds up in a systematic 
and orderly manner a history of cooperation on 
the basis of members’ mutual respect and of the 
accumulation of measures put in place. Once 
this condition is met, countries may have to pay 
signiﬁ  cant reputational costs when they decline to 
comply with what has been agreed. Although we 
should of course be careful not to draw too rosy a 
picture, we believe the G20’s star can be reasonably 
said to be in the ascendant, in consideration of how 
much closer the opinions of advanced countries 
and emerging market countries have progressively 
come in the course of our meetings since its outset. 
Chart 8
Proportions of global trade 
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Note: •   Reserve currency countries include euro area member countries, Japan, 
the United Kingdom and the United States. 
• Euro area member countries excluding Belgium, Slovak Republic, Slovenia. 
Source: IMF (International Financial Statistics).
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